In March 2007, a four-day meeting was held in Lakes State, Southern Sudan to discuss and establish a new state-level council of traditional leaders. Supported by the Swiss government and organized by a Southern Sudanese consultancy company, the meeting brought dozens of chiefs to Rumbek, the state capital, together with several government officials and ministers from county, state, and central governments. The meeting's 'facilitator' and reporter, a senior South Sudanese academic and consultant, opened the floor to the chiefs on the first afternoon with a request that they be "time-conscious, stay focused on the agenda, be brief in their remarks, and avoid repeating each other". By the second day, however, some resistance to such limitations emerged:
The commissioner of Cueibet County suggested that the Chiefs should be given the whole of that day to talk off their heads instead of going into groups for discussions. He underlined that the Dinka believe in talking out their issues. The suggestion was seconded by Chief Majak Malok from Rumbek East County. He said that the government leaders are the ones confusing the whole situation in our region.
At this point the Facilitator/Consultant emphasized that the purpose of the conference was to come up with resolutions through discussions. He said that all the communities in the Southern Sudan like to talk and talk and talk, but we have to get down to solving problems through group discussions-which allowed us to handle several problems at a time. The four days conference, he reminded them, has limits such as the logistics and the time factor. He said that the way forward is to be derived from such discussions so that reports are for all who want to see how we are moving forward. 1 The facilitator and other organizers succeeded in keeping the meeting to its agenda and in producing the required resolutions concerning the formation of a Lakes State Council of Traditional Authority Leaders (CoTAL), which fed into the longer-term process of establishing CoTALs across South Sudan. 2 This Rumbek meeting had epitomized a particular moment in South Sudan's history at a time when the momentum for peace and independence was generating new internationallysupported efforts at state-building, in which traditional authority was being given a key place in local government and in nation-building narratives and legislation. External actors in particular tended to assume that such state-building was starting from scratch; 3 even the leading chief in the Rumbek meeting asserted that " [f] or the first time in South Sudanese history, we have formed a permanent structure under the guidance of the traditional leaders". 4 But as I argue elsewhere, chiefs had been central to the structures and processes of state formation at the local level for the past century or more. 5 And the formal or semi-formal 'meeting' has itself been a central mechanism of local government since the colonial era. It is important to recognise that the new South Sudanese state has emerged not only through political and military struggle, but also through the historical experiences and institutionalisation of state orders at this local level. shifting and inconsistent, authoritarianism of state actors in Southern (now South) Sudan. But it also demonstrates the truculence and outspokenness of 'subjects' whose robust oral political cultures and practices have never been easily silenced or controlled. As other scholars have increasingly argued, focusing solely on the authoritarianism or assumed weak legitimacy of states neglects the extent to which the symbols and discourses of state authority have to be "performed into existence", and the limits to which such performances can be controlled or their meaning fixed by state elites. 6 Meetings might appear too banal, ubiquitous, and impotent to be considered as distinctive institutions of the local state in South Sudan. Scholars have tended to discount the potential for negotiating government at this local level, emphasizing instead the authoritarian, centralizing, and repressive character of the Sudanese state, its alienation from Southern Sudanese society, and the lack of any genuine opportunity for debate, decision-making, or democracy in local government. Despite a recurrent state rhetoric of decentralization, the local government councils that were first established under British rule and remodelled under successive Sudanese governments were in reality mechanisms of an overall centralizing agenda. 7 These councils are seen at best to have widened the composition of the local elites that had been entrenched under colonial indirect rule, centring on 'traditional' chiefly families. 8 The scholarship on local government reforms in British African colonies is similarly sceptical about the extent of change these wrought, either in the power of local elites or in relations between central and local government. 9 Writing in the 1970s, John Howell argued that "representative and effective local government in the southern Sudan [had] failed to evolve", depicting chiefs as largely conservative, parochial, and subordinate to higher political authorities. 10 Later studies of the local councils established under the rebel government of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) after 1997 have also tended to emphasize their limited capacity and authority.
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It is hardly surprising then that the government and external agencies involved in postconflict state-building have tended to assume that their task is one of 'construction' rather than 'reconstruction'. The only local institution recognized in such efforts has been the chief, or 'traditional leader', 12 whose authority is assumed to derive from indigenous legitimacy rather than from the state, and to have been undermined by war and autocratic governments. 13 These authors also remind us to avoid the overly positive or harmonious connotations of the term 'negotiation': "Contrary to commonsensical assumptions, negotiation does not occur between co-equal parties or in an inclusive manner... the political configurations and institutional arrangements that result from such negotiation processes must be seen as imprints of domination by the more powerful over weaker groups". 17 This paper argues that local government meetings are indeed revealing of the hierarchies, formalities, and restrictions that have structured political dialogue and produced the political elites who constitute and control the local state. But it also argues that these inequalities and limitations should not obscure the significance of the negotiations that take place in these meetings, and of the ideas about the state that they have produced. Despite the absence of a clear boundary between state and non-state actors among the local elites, the purpose of the meetings is to enact a dichotomy and dialogue between state representatives and 'communities': an opportunity for government to speak to society and (though less so) vice versa. In the process, meetings help to constitute the very idea of the state as a discrete entity. 18 This performance of a binary conversation is structured by political hierarchies among and between both sides, and by the bureaucratic conventions and procedures to which the Rumbek facilitator clung. But as his struggle to keep the participants to the meeting's agenda reveals, it is also a process fraught with tensions and unpredictability. The meeting is a performance of state authority and political order, but it is also a moment in which the limits of state control may be exposed, even if only momentarily, because the fiction of genuine dialogue has to be maintained and therefore space given for subjects to speak.
The paper begins by exploring the institutionalization of the meeting as the primary attended by the bulk of the village headmen." The purpose of meetings was still primarily for the DC "to explain our intentions to the people and to assess the reactions of public opinion to them". But it was envisaged that eventually councils would be "making suggestions to us", and that "in a council of elders an admixture of a younger and educated element would probably be advantageous". 27 By the 1940s, town councils certainly had more varied membership than just chiefs and headmen, and were taking on a wide range of local government functions and bureaucratic procedures:
Juba Town Council dealt with brickmaking, town roads, times of meeting and the necessity for giving members a better idea of their duties and responsibilities. To this end a sub-committee was formed to discuss the 'literature' needed to educate the members in their job, eg copies of the warrants, the Local Government townships legislation etc. 28 When provincial and national assemblies were instituted in the 1950s, many of the southern members were chiefs, but some were teachers or other literate government employees. The small class of literate Southerners were also organizing political committees and holding "both formal and informal meetings". 29 However, both the British officials and the new northern Sudanese administrators who were taking over from them in the 1950s were determined to control or prevent potentially subversive 'political' meetings, which were made subject to government approval. Chiefs' meetings, on the other hand, remained a principle local government mechanism, and, if anything, increased in significance after independence in 1956. The uprising in Equatorian towns that began with the Torit army garrison mutiny in August 1955 left a legacy of government paranoia and increasingly repressive security measures. Yet almost immediately after the uprising, the government began to revive chiefs' meetings. 30 Some of these were clearly very short and sharp:
an opportunity to exhort chiefs to cooperate in maintaining security and informing on any fugitives. One meeting in Yei lasted just one hour; clearly there was little opportunity (and perhaps little desire on either side) for the chiefs to say anything. 31 Several chiefs had taken part in the uprising and were imprisoned or had fled; the remaining chiefs were clearly careful to reiterate their loyalty to the government. But it is nevertheless revealing that chiefs and headmen in Zande District made speeches about the significance of meetings in themselves, as a means of bringing peace and restoring order. One headman thanked the DC for arranging a meeting in Tembura because it "shows that the government is in existence"; a sub-chief "welcomed the DC's speech, and expressed his gratitude for the restoration of order in the area". The chiefs and government officials clearly portrayed the meeting as a means of reconstituting the local state after the crisis of 1955, and were happy for it to be as public as possible: it was reportedly held
"in the open" rather than in the council chambers because "there was a big crowd in attendance (about 1500 men & women)". 32 The newly independent administration also placed considerable emphasis on organizing 'tribal' or 'border' chiefs' meetings, which had been a regular colonial mechanism for the specific purpose of resolving sectional conflicts and disputes. At such meetings in 1957, chiefs signed bonds taking on personal liability in the form of cattle for any contraventions of the peace agreements; more than ever they were being treated as the individual embodiment of their 'communities' in these meetings. One 1957 meeting of Mundari and Dinka chiefs stressed that of all the grazing rules they produced, "[t]he most important rule is that annual meeting shall be held", again underscoring the weight given to meetings as an institution in themselves. 33 Written resolutions and agreements were the required outcome of 'tribal' meetings, which were sporadically revived in the 1970s and 1980s to address local conflicts. Unsurprisingly, attending meetings has become seen as a central aspect of chiefs' work.
During a study of traditional authorities in 2004, people were asked about the role of chiefs and a typical response was "the chief takes our voice to meetings". 34 Chiefs' ability to organize meetings in their own villages was also frequently cited as a measure of how active and able they were. Local government administrators emphasized that when they needed labour or when there was any project or work to do, they held meetings with chiefs and expected chiefs to organize meetings of their communities. Perhaps even more significantly, a number of people I interviewed over the last decade described 'law' as something that was 'made' in meetings of government, chiefs, and elders. 35 Even in the context of wartime, meetings were significant for relations between the SPLA and the civilian population: one headman near Yei emphasized the importance of attending meetings with the SPLA to "talk and bring out laws" to handle the problems of the war, including regulating requisitioning and conscription. Each Chief brought his small party of followers and also his deck chair and pipe, and proceeded to make himself at home in my verandah, reposing in his chair, smoking his pipe and expectorating all over the floor, but taking great interest and joining in the conversation in a loud and boisterous manner and at times backed up by three or four of their followers, all talking loudly together. Apparently they had been accustomed to do this with the Belgians. As some had brought complaints and minor cases they wish settled, I found it necessary to very soon clear my verandah and get to work. 39 The 'loud and boisterous' talk of the chiefs is here juxtaposed with the real 'work' of government, which entailed controlling and channelling speeches into the official hearing of 'cases'. A later government visitor to the same province reported a particularly heated meeting to discuss the contentious issue of government expropriations of land for forest reserves, involving "the alcoholic Chief and certain raucous spokesmen of the tribe". In an instantaneous enactment of bureaucratic order, the British District Commissioner, Mr Duke, set up his table to convene the meeting on the ground:
I think I shall never in my life forget the lorry stopping and the driver automatically producing from the rear a table and chair, on which Duke placed himself au beau milieu de la route, discussing the pros and cons with a fat file in front of him; neither shall I forget the feverishly expectant eyes of the tribe, watching the discussion as it proceeded in Moru, Arabic and English alternately. 40 In such public meetings, the audience or crowd played a significant role, albeit as a collective, One of the attendants replied by telling the Repeater 'Agamlong' to repeat his question with a loud voice. But Chief Mathok Malek stopped him from talking on the grounds that he is a chief and 'the talk should be left to the members of the public'. The would-be questioner kept quiet.
Various members of 'the public' then asked critical questions. One complained that the southern representatives were too divided in parliament to achieve federation: "we have seen that we need medicines for ourselves and for our cattle, we need schools, but none of these is here now."
"Another member of the public said you our children have courage but what I hear from the others is that we are ignorant, incapable of making cars and aeroplanes, where will you find these things if you federate the country (divide the country literally) and are we very ignorant?" [The reporter appears to have included a literal translation of the Dinka idiom for federalization here.]
MP Wol responded by arguing that people might be illiterate but "you are highly reasonable and wise". At this point, however, the record states that a "mad man" sang a song, and that everyone joined in with it. Another speaker complained about the MPs' inactivity once they arrived at Parliament, concluding with what appears very much like a curse: "God is great, if any of you forgets us again, he, God, will thunder him." 43 The "mad man" then got up and sang what is now described as "his war song", but "it was replied by about three only, people having been fed up".
The madman said "I want to tell you why there has not been rain. It is the 'Turuk' who spoilt the rain." "The members of the meeting laughed." MP Wol seems to have interpreted the word Turuk as a reference to northern Sudanese, promising that federation would solve this problem too and it would be the Turuk who had no rain afterwards. But Turuk is a term used more widely to refer to government personnel, including Southerners like this MP. 44 The meeting reportedly ended, appropriately enough, with a "rain ceremonial song". 45 One wonders whether Wol regretted the innovative step of convening a public meeting, rather than the usual meeting of chiefs, and thus expanding the boundaries of who could speak and what could be said -or sung, songs being a particularly effective way of voicing criticism.
The report of the meeting appears to have been produced by someone who could understand 
Meetings as negotiation tables
When tables do feature quite literally in the architecture of meetings, they very much reinforce the hierarchies and the dichotomy between government and society; in this sense they remain an apt metaphor for the structures of negotiation. Meetings have always been used by the government officials behind the table primarily to transmit messages and orders, and secondarily for limited consultation: to get answers to particular questions, or to compel the resolution of conflicts. Meeting records largely document the imperative speeches of governors and commissioners, who 'urge', 'tell', and 'order' the chiefs to follow government directives. 47 The space opened for discussion after such speeches was usually a very limited one, and those chiefs whose speech was actually reported were clearly adept at sticking to the limits of acceptable discourse, and taking the opportunity to curry government favour. Political hierarchies are constantly evident, both in terms of who was able to speak at a meeting, and in terms of the order in which they spoke or the attention paid to what they said. But however formal and formulaic much of the dialogue might have been, it was never simply scripted. Chiefs and other speakers found ways to express grievances, to criticize government, and to negotiate some aspects of administration. And in a more general sense, the structuring and performance of meetings as a dialogue between state and society has provided an opportunity to negotiate ideas and discourses of a state-society contract, which has in turn contributed to popular expectations of the state.
In their quest for legitimacy, the speeches of government officials in meetings have tended to emphasize notions of contract or reciprocal bargaining, demanding cooperation and compliance in return for state protection, services, and development. In the early to mid-colonial period, their rhetoric was often paternalistic, promising protection in return for tribute, and professing concern for the welfare of 'their' people, for whom the chiefs were the trusted spokesmen:
Throughout the year the burden of the District Commissioner's exhortations to the chiefs has been 'I am your servant, you are the important people the fathers of your tribesmen, their well-being and their interests are your immediate and most important concern -tell me what they have to say, give me your opinions'. 48 At chiefs' meetings in the later 1950s, new Sudanese administrators urged chiefs to maintain security and to make their people work hard and cultivate more crops, and in return they would receive agricultural assistance and medical services. 49 The governor of Equatoria made explicit in a speech to one chiefs' meeting in 1957 the relationship between hard work, payment of taxes, and state service provision: "To preserve our independence and meet our needs of life we must produce more crops in order to be able to pay more taxes which will be spent by your Councils on your services". 50 Southern politicians reiterated similar messages at political meetings. Before he was interrupted by the "mad man", Alfred Wol began the public meeting at Thiet with a typical government exhortation: "I am advising you all to cultivate well this year and to cultivate well yearly". 51 In 1974, a meeting was held at Gemeiza to discuss proposals for a sugar scheme with the Mundari population. Clearly facing concerns about the impact of the scheme on their grazing and cultivation areas, Hilary Paul Logali, the Southern Regional Minister of Finance and Planning, tried to reassure them that the scheme would only bring benefits: "What the Mundari people needed, the Govt. shall give, since according to the socialist Principles, the people are the Govt". 52 The discourse of government officials opened up the potential for chiefs and others to negotiate along similar lines, with the payment of taxes a particular focus for bargaining and contracting. In the 1930s and 1940s, chiefs argued in their meetings with colonial officials for more favourable relationships between the prices obtained for their crops and the rate or timing of taxation. Both the government-fixed prices for cash-crops like cotton and the high prices charged by (mainly northern Sudanese) traders were a frequent source of complaint. As one DC reported "the Dinka are convinced that the merchants and the Government are two aspects of the same thing -and I have been twitted at public meetings for being very thick with the merchants". 53 Even in the tense atmosphere of the immediate post-independence period, the Zande chief James Tembura argued that since his area suffered from a lack of cash crops (coffee, cotton, tobacco), his people should not be expected to pay as much tax as other areas where there were more lucrative crops. He also complained about the lack of medical services in Tembura.
Increasingly by this time, chiefs and other speakers were demanding government services in return for the payment of taxes. 54 In 1955 But the chiefs quickly moved on to blame "the intellectual classes" for undermining "Rule of law" by interfering in chiefs' court cases, and to assert the importance of law and proper judicial procedure to the resolution and prevention of conflicts. One 'young' chief blamed the government "for non-implementation of the resolutions agreed in conferences". Another 'young' chief declared a "point of order": "In that he observed from many colleagues who talked they didn't concentrate on the agenda". Such criticisms were a common way of asserting a superior knowledge of procedure. Of course government officials also used such procedures to restrict the 'talk' of the chiefs; when one chief accused the province prison commissioner of provoking conflicts, he "was stopped by a point of order to confine himself to agenda". Another chief "asked the Commissioner to give him permission to point out some government malpractices.
The request was refused." The various criticisms made by the chiefs did not make their way into the formal 'resolutions' of these meetings, which concentrated on the responsibilities of chiefs to report and prevent fighting. But the chiefs' criticisms of government "malpractices" and judicial failings were recorded in the meeting reports, and it is clear that they seized the opportunity to assert their superior knowledge of how government was supposed to work, and to distance themselves from its current corruptions. One senior chief "praised the past English Government and blamed the present Regional Government for improper Administration". By expressing their criticisms in the very language of the government, the chiefs (mostly) stayed within the bounds of acceptable discourse in these meetings, and exposed the inability of government officials to silence them.
Such tactics were also apparent over twenty years later, when a newly-appointed read it at such a public meeting, enabled the chiefs to make more vocal criticism than they might otherwise have attempted.
At the Rumbek chiefs' meeting in 2007 with which this paper began, chiefs followed many of the long-established conventions of discourse and procedure. The first chief to speak began in the usual way by expressing "his happiness with the occasion" and his "wish to embrace the culture of harmony". But he then immediately "proposed that they, Chiefs, should be informed in writing in advance for occasions like this, complaining about the need to be put in the picture ahead of time-with all details of the event to take place. He advised anyone organizing such meetings to note his remarks." This chief had thus quickly seized the opportunity to establish his own authority by criticizing the organization of the meeting; his remarks were echoed by some of the other chiefs, forcing the organizers to respond with an apology and a promise to better follow "procedures" in future. Another chief similarly began by expressing his happiness at the creation of the forum, but then went on to voice his scepticism about its efficacy:
He noted that he attended several conferences and workshops and a lot of resolutions have been made and promises were made but, to his surprise, nothing came forth. 'It is you leaders who travel to Juba and Khartoum who are accountable for such failures.' 60 An even more revealing exchange took place at another meeting organized as part of the same initiative to establish councils of traditional leaders, this time in Western Equatoria State. The state government sought to use the gathering for the longstanding purposes of local government meetings, requesting the organizers "to prolong the meeting for one day to give the state government the opportunity to inform the chiefs as community representatives about a variety of issues". However, "even before the presentation started the chiefs took the opportunity to set their own agenda". They made a series of complaints about encroachment on their judicial authority by other courts and about their lack of consultation on land allocations. The state government then attempted "to sensitize the chiefs to prevent poaching and to support the wildlife authority", which provoked 'critical remarks' from the chiefs:
The first chief stressed that often security staff such as soldiers, police or prison authorities are involved in poaching. The chief explained that it would be difficult for the chiefs to work together with security agencies to fight poaching as these agencies are at the same time involved in poaching. Chiefs became loud and started to talk but were stopped. Some chiefs walked out angrily. 61 An attempt by the state Ministry for Agriculture to lecture the chiefs about illegal logging met with a similar reaction. As the international consultant who wrote up the meeting report noted, the chiefs clearly turned around this particular dialogue with the government to articulate their own grievances and criticisms:
The chiefs challenged the ministries when they felt that the state government asked for their support to solve problems caused by the state government itself. The chiefs used the meeting which was planned by the government as an event to inform chiefs as a platform to raise their concerns... The chiefs seemed to realize that they share many problems... Challenging the administration seemed to be easier as a member of a council than as an individual.
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While the state government had, as usual, seen this meeting as an opportunity to promulgate its orders and exhort chiefs to enforce them, this occasion instead demonstrated the perennial risks of bringing chiefs together and presenting them with a government discourse that they could turn back on its speakers. The ability to speak boldly in such meetings was often cited by my informants as a criterion of good chiefship. One elderly woman near Yei recalled a famous chief of the colonial period: "He was brave, so much that he would even bang the 64 But they have been used by government officials over the past century to legitimize government orders and demands by creating a performance of dialogue and discussion, and by consistently speaking in contractual terms, promising as well as threatening, and raising expectations as well as fears. In turn, the chiefs and other recognized community representatives have adopted this discourse to make demands and to negotiate reciprocal bargains. Whether or not this 'talk' had any effect on government is perhaps less significant than its wider effects in raising popular expectations of the state. Meetings have become seen as an opportunity to express these expectations, to demand services, and to (carefully) protest government failings: a church preacher in 2005 asserted that "villages need meetings for development". 65 In one sense, these effects suggest the success of government officials in using meetings to establish the legitimacy of state authority. But, in another sense, they show that the idea of the state and its discourses of law and bureaucratic order have also become a language of protest and demand.
Conclusion
The authoritarianism of the Sudanese state's political culture is hard to dispute and even harder to dislodge, as the increasing opposition in recent years to its inheritance or equivalence by the South Sudanese state testifies. But if local government meetings reveal this authoritarianism in the imperative speeches of officials and the hierarchical construction of order, they also expose the fragility of government control over a population that has, to say the least, proved consistently difficult to rule. In perceiving discussion as the best means of dissemination, colonial government officials and their successors constituted meetings as opportunities for the elites of the local state, particularly chiefs, to question, debate, and at times challenge government policies. This necessitated the explanation and justification of policies by officials in order to gain their endorsement and legitimization by the meetings. But the resulting official rhetoric of a state-society contract -involving state protection and service provision in return for compliance, labour, and taxes -produced ideas and expectations of the state which took a firm hold in wider society, and which chiefs and other meeting participants could deploy to criticize government failings within the discursive conventions of bureaucratic meetings.
These meetings may not have produced many tangible outcomes -the room to negotiate government orders, let alone to hold government officials to account, was always extremely limited. But that should not obscure their effects, in Mitchell's sense of the state as an idea or 'effect' produced by such performances, which "should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist". 66 The ordering of these meetings as a two-dimensional, hierarchical exchange created the impression of a clear divide between government and society that was blurred or non-existent in the everyday politics of the local state. The performance of this dichotomy has contributed to the idea of the state as an entity standing separate from society, to which people might appeal against the failings and corruptions of local government.
The performance also exposed the vulnerability of government officials, reminding them of their weakness in the face of 'noisy' subjects. They might react reflexively to this experience, silencing chiefs in the meeting or its record, and reminding them of their dependence on government. But officials were trapped by the logic and structure of the meeting as a performance of state-society dialogue: by making chiefs the mouthpiece of 'society', and by recognizing them as 'legitimate counterparts' at the negotiation table, they could less easily sanction them as individuals for their speeches in meetings. Of course this worked both ways: by participating at this negotiation table, chiefs also gave their recognition to government officials as legitimate counterparts, even as they criticized or challenged them. And when chiefs returned from meetings, they in turn became the mouthpiece of government orders. Meetings thus simultaneously reminded officials and chiefs of their mutual dependence and mutual vulnerability, and ultimately confirmed their collective membership of the local political elite.
Above all these meetings demonstrate that, however authoritarian the state may be, its authority has never been simply a top-down projection of power, but rather the product of the multiple local-level negotiations and performances through which it has taken hold in the political imagination and experience of these local elites, and in wider society.
